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INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most famous sentence in the Declaration of Independence,
for twenty-first century readers, is its statement of the "self-evident" truth
that "all Men are created equal," and that they are "endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights," which include "Life, Liberty, and
the pursuit of Happiness."' Equally famous is the Declaration's explanation
that the very purpose of organized government is "to secure these
[unalienable] Rights" through political forms that "deriv[e] their just
Powers from the Consent of the Governed.' 2 But that is not the end of the
sentence. Jefferson goes on to assert that it is equally "self-evident" "[t]hat
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends"-
that is, of securing unalienable rights-"it is the Right of the People to alter
or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on
such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."
3
The notion that governments have a responsibility to protect
fundamental human rights seems as self-evident to many today as it was to
Thomas Jefferson and his colleagues. Around the world, people have been
socialized to believe in universal human rights; Jefferson's famous
language resonates far more broadly and deeply now, in the twenty-first
century, than it ever did in 1776.
* Jack M. Balkin is Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at the
Yale Law School; Sanford Levinson holds the W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr.
Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas Law School and is also Professor of Government,
University of Texas at Austin. This Article is based on remarks given at a conference on the Declaration
of Independence at the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia on April 14, 2015. We are grateful
to Alex Tsesis for inviting us to participate, and for arranging the videoconferencing that made
Levinson's participation possible.
1. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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But what about he rest of this famous sentence? Is it equally clear that
any group that designates itself as a "People" has a self-evident right "to
alter or to abolish" "any Form of Government" that it believes has become
"destructive" of its rights or the rights of its members?4 Is it a self-evident
truth that members of the public, both around the world and in the United
States, have the right to overthrow their government if they feel it is not
sufficiently protecting their rights? The Declaration's use of the word
"any" suggests that no government is immune from the right to alter or
abolish.
The right of a people to throw off their government is not confined to
a single sentence in the Declaration. The idea pervades the entire
document, especially its first and last paragraphs. The first paragraph
asserts that "it [has] become[] necessary for one People to dissolve the
Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume
among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them."5 The last paragraph
"[d]eclare[s], [t]hat these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be
Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to
the British Crown, and that all political Connection between them and the
State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved."6
In his invaluable study of the impact of the Declaration around the
world, David Armitage emphasizes that the first and last paragraphs of the
Declaration-which actually declare independence-have had far more
significance in world history than the assertion of rights set out in
paragraph two. 7 The reason is not difficult to see. The beginning of the
Declaration asserts the existence of "one People" who have the right to
throw off their erstwhile rulers, to whose rule they no longer consent, while
the final paragraph proclaims the entry of that people into the international
community of sovereign states, with all of the rights and privileges that free
and independent states enjoy in international law. Every nationalist
assertion, every revolutionary movement, and every secessionist party after
1776 could point to the Declaration of Independence as justification for its
4. Although the Declaration does not guarantee a right to happiness, it guarantees a right to
pursue happiness. What then, if that that opportunity is (substantially or completely) denied? See
Timothy W. Ryback, Opinion, The UN. Happiness Project, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/opinion/the-un-happiness-project.html (discussing United Nations
Resolution 65/309, in which the General Assembly unanimously endorsed placing "happiness," the
primary aspirational value of the Kingdom of Bhutan, on its agenda).
5. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1.
6. Id. para. 33.
7. See generally DAVID ARMITAGE, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: A GLOBAL
HISTORY (2007).
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cause.
Americans, who are especially enamored of phrases like "all Men are
created equal" and "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," tend to
forget the all-important assertions of peoplehood and collective sovereignty
that lie at the heart of the Declaration. "Once independence had become an
uncontested fact," Armitage writes, "Americans had little need to
remember the assertions of independent statehood in the Declaration's
opening and closing paragraphs."8 Well, not quite. In the middle of the
nineteenth century, a sizeable group of Americans remembered these words
all too well. The Southern states that attempted to leave the Union between
Abraham Lincoln's election and the beginning of the Civil War styled
themselves as the defenders of the Declaration's right of revolution, and of
the right of "one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have
connected them with another,"9 because they no longer consented to the
federal government. Even today, when one approaches the Texas State
Capitol in Austin, one is likely to see a substantial monument to Jefferson
Davis and the Confederate war dead, inscribed with the following words:
DIED FOR STATE RIGHTS GUARANTEED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION
THE PEOPLE OF THE SOUTH, ANIMATED BY THE SPIRIT OF
1776, TO PRESERVE THEIR RIGHTS, WITHDREW FROM THE
FEDERAL COMPACT IN 1861. THE NORTH RESORTED TO
COERCION. THE SOUTH, AGAINST OVERWHELMING
NUMBERS AND RESOURCES, FOUGHT UNTIL EXHAUSTED.'°
It comes as little surprise, then, that South Carolina's Ordinance of
Secession would allude to the Declaration's powerful conclusion that
former colonies, and now former members of the Union, "are, and of Right
ought to be Free and Independent States."'" As it was in 1776, so it was in
1861, or so the Confederates asserted. For the North, this was not a second
Declaration of Independence, it was a Declaration of Treason. The
question, of course, then, as now, is how to tell the difference.
The Southern invocation of the Declaration poses a second problem,
which remains with us to this day. The legislature of South Carolina
asserted that it spoke on behalf of "one People"-the people of South
Carolina. But not everyone in South Carolina agreed that secession was
8. Id. at 93.
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1.
10. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 313 (6th ed. 2015).
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 31.
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justified. Many Southerners remained loyal to the United States.12 And not
to put too fine a point on it, the secession ordinance was speaking for the
white people of South Carolina, who constituted less than 45 percent of the
total population of that state in 1860.13 To the Confederate revolutionaries,
though, slaves were not part of the people whose consent or lack of consent
mattered.
In the North, however, many would have begged to differ. The
South's claim of a people withholding consent to a tyrannical government
was a monstrous fiction-one part of the South was asserting the right to
drag the rest of its population with it. And instead of leaving the Union in a
quest for freedom, Confederates were doubling down on the right to engage
in oppressions of their own.
When nationalist and secessionist movements arise, they are rarely
unanimous. During the Revolutionary War, the American colonies were
full of loyal British subjects who wanted no part of what the "Patriots"
were offering.14 Then, as now, the question is how to tell whether "one
People" really have decided to exercise their right to alter or abolish and
throw off government, or whether a political crisis has been manufactured
by a rump faction, or, even worse, by a group of local hegemons who want
free rein to oppress a local minority.
The goal of this Article is twofold. The first goal is to remind us of the
language in the Declaration that actually mattered the most to the most
people in history: not the language of equality and rights, but the language
of collective sovereignty, independence, and nationalist self-assertion. The
second goal is to point out that this language, powerful and memorable as it
is, raises a host of complications and problems that have never fully been
solved, from Jefferson's time to our own.
There are any number of books and essays that call upon us to take the
12. See, e.g., DAVID WILLIAMS, BITTERLY DIVIDED: THE SOUTH'S INNER CIVIL WAR 2-3, 10, 35
(2008) (noting strong opposition to secession even in the states that ultimately left the Union). In fact,
the problem in 1861 is the same problem that occurred in 1787. Article VII of the Constitution
authorized the people of South Carolina and the other states to organize a convention that would speak
in that people's name. A ratifying convention was called, and it ratified the proposed Constitution, thus
joining the Union. JOHN R. VILE, 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA'S FOUNDING 658 (2005) (noting final vote of 149-73 within the South
Carolina convention). But, of course, not everyone in South Carolina had initially consented in 1787.
Some people opposed the new government, and some-like the state's large population of slaves-
were not even consulted.
13. Michael Trinkley, South Carolina-African-Americans--Slave Population, S.C.'S INFO.
HIGHWAY, http://www.sciway.net/afam/slavery/population.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2016).
14. See, for example, Maya Jasanoff's deservedly prize-winning book, LIBERTY'S EXILES:
AMERICAN LOYALISTS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY WORLD 8-9 (2011).
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Declaration's language seriously-by which is usually meant taking
seriously its inspiring passages about human equality and inalienable
human rights.15 Yet we might also ask ourselves what it would mean to
take the other parts seriously-the parts of the document that actually
declare independence-and consider whether there is an equally
inalienable right to do so.
I. WHAT KIND OF RIGHT IS THE RIGHT TO ALTER OR ABOLISH?
Jefferson's language raises at least eight different sets of questions.
A. INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY?: THE ROLE OF REAL
ESTATE
The Declaration speaks of the right of "one People" to dissolve their
political bonds and take their rightful place among the nations of the earth.
These words assert a collective right of revolt.
Recently, Randy Barnett has argued that the Declaration's language
concerns "individual popular sovereignty" as opposed to collective popular
sovereignty. 16 Because Barnett supports a libertarian interpretation of the
Declaration, he emphasizes that each and every individual is a political
sovereign with inalienable rights. 
17
The notion of individual popular sovereignty might be plausible
within an ongoing polity in which people fight for their inalienable rights
and seek reforms within the existing system. But the idea of individual
popular sovereignty does not translate very well into an individual right to
revolt. Revolutions are collective enterprises, which, when successful, tend
to drag everyone else in the country, willing and unwilling, along with
them. For every patriot urging revolt, there is a loyalist objecting, perhaps
living right next door.
The notion of the loyalist living next door is important because it
reminds us that the Declaration was actually about the right to secede from
Great Britain and keep control of the land on which the former colonies
rested.
15. Some recent distinguished examples include: DANIELLE ALLEN, OUR DECLARATION: A
READING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN DEFENSE OF EQUALITY (2014) (emphasizing
equality); RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016) (emphasizing natural rights); ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR
LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2012)
(emphasizing both liberty and equality).
16. Randy E. Barnett, We the People: Each and Every One, 123 YALE L.J. 2576, 2596 (2014).
17. Id. at 2612.
2016]
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The right to revolt is as much about territory as it is about freedom.
Successful political revolutions are also revolutions in real estate. And
because they concern real estate, they require large groups of people to get
together to collectively throw off their oppressors and keep the land over
which their oppressors once ruled. As any good real estate agent will tell
you, the Declaration of Independence is really about location, location,
location.
If the right to alter or abolish government were placed in individuals,
as opposed to large groups of people, it would be either fruitless or an
invitation to anarchy. Individuals cannot, of their own accord, secede from
their countries, declare political independence, and remain in place. People
who try this are eventually surrounded by S.W.A.T. teams and forced to
capitulate. If individuals want to refuse consent to the government they live
under, the standard remedy is emigration. They don't get to take the land
with them. Barnett's idea of individual popular sovereignty makes the most
sense as a right to press for recognition of one's rights within an ongoing
regime, or, failing that, as a right to leave the country; it makes relatively
little sense as a right of individual secession.
As a practical matter, then, the right to alter or abolish is a collective
right, not an individual right. It is the right of a group of people to change
their government while remaining in place. One can certainly imagine
political revolutions in which whole populations emigrate to create their
own new nation. The Biblical story in the Book of Exodus is the most
obvious example. But such large scale moves are cumbersome at best, and
present enormous collective action problems for revolutionaries. (In the
Exodus story, it helped a great deal that the Almighty himself solved the
collective action problems.'8) Forced relocation of unwilling populations
by a centralized government, like the infamous Trail of Tears, is a far more
likely scenario than the Biblical exodus. When modem day revolutionaries
argue "Let my people go," what they usually mean is, "Let my people go
and keep the real estate."
And there's the rub. When revolutionaries overthrow government,
control over territory is usually the motivation, and once successful,
18. Of course, once the Israelites made it to the wilderness, the leadership of Moses and Aaron
was challenged repeatedly, most notably by Korah and his followers. See Numbers 16. By today's
standards, at least, Korah's rhetoric seems decidedly populist in tone: "For all in the congregation are
holy, every one of them, and the LORD is among them. Why then do you exalt yourselves above the
assembly of the LORD?" Id. at 16:3. However, instead of calling for elections, God's response was to
cause the earth to swallow up Korah and his followers. Id. at 16:31-34. Although the Declaration
informs us that inalienable rights-including the right to revolt-are endowed by God, those guarantees
had not been published at the time these events took place.
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reshuffling land rights quickly becomes a major problem. What to do with
the people who did not go along? Do they get to keep their land, or should
they be expelled or "encouraged" to emigrate, as happened to Loyalists
following the American Revolution?19 What of the property held by the
former government? Finally, what about the demands of the people for land
reform? Should the estates of the old hierarchy be broken up and
distributed equitably to the people, or must they remain, like a bone in the
throat of the new regime? It is no accident that, following the American
Revolution, in the debates over the Treaty of Paris, land claims were a
central bone of contention. And it is also no accident that many of the early
cases before the federal courts, like Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,20 involved
disputed claims over lands formerly owned by the British nobility or
Loyalist subjects.
B. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY OR INALIENABLE RIGHTS?
The Declaration attempts to link the rights of popular sovereignty and
self-determination to the preservation and protection of the inalienable
individual rights that governments are created to serve. But the connection
between these ideas is contingent: the consent of the governed is
19. See ROBERT PALMER, I AGE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1760-1800: THE CHALLENGE 188 (1959). Palmer notes that even if we adopt a
low estimate of sixty thousand as the number of such dmigrfs, that is still substantially higher as a
percentage of the total population of the United States at the time than the percentage of those who went
into exile as a result of the revolution that occurred in France a decade later. Id. Palmer reminds his
readers that the Revolution was a "painful conflict" for all concerned. Id. It might have begun with a
Tea Party, but, as Chairman Mao reminded us, a revolution is "not a dinner party .... A revolution is
an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another." MAO TSE-TUNG, Report on
an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, in I SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG 23, 28
(Cent. Comm. of the Communist Party of China ed. & trans., 1st ed. 1965). See generally JASANOFF,
supra note 14 (detailing the stories of several Loyalist refugees after the American Revolution).
The emigration and displacement of the losers is, of course, not an example of "American
exceptionalism." Tony Judt's magnificent book on Europe after 1945 actually begins with an analysis
of the dissolution during and immediately after World War I of the great empires that had organized
much of Central and Eastern Europe, all in the name of self-determination (a point which we discuss
further infra). TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945, at 1-10 (2005). Given that
people(s) claimed the right to leave the previous imperial order while keeping the lands they occupied;
this immediately led to massive ethnic cleansing or, more euphemistically, transfer of populations. Id. at
4-10. The same regrettable phenomenon continued at the close of the twentieth century, during the
disastrous dissolution of Yugoslavia and the fight over who would control the real estate of Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Kosovo area of Serbia. See The Breakup of Yugoslavia, 1990-1992, U.S.
DEP'T ST. OFF. HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/breakup-yugoslavia (last
updated Oct. 31, 2013). And, of course, our own era features the further dissolution of the ostensible
settlements reached to conclude World War I in the Middle East, with similarly vast emigration,
especially from Syria. See SYRIAN REFUGEES: SNAPSHOT CRISIS-MIDDLE EAST & EUR.,
http://syrianrefugees.eu/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2016).
20. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
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conceptually distinct from the preservation of individual rights. Indeed, the
tension between protecting individual rights and respecting popular
sovereignty is a recurring issue in liberal political and constitutional
theory. 21
Obviously, governments that govern without popular consent may feel
free to violate individual rights, but sometimes they may actually protect
them better, depending on the nature of the right. For example, a monarchy
may respect religious pluralism more effectively than a democracy; a
plutocracy or oligarchy may protect property rights far better than a
redistribution-minded popular government, and so on.
Yet even if a government respects individual rights, it may still govern
without the people's consent. And governing without popular consent by
itself violates the right to self-determination that the Declaration posits. A
people-however defined-possesses the collective right to govern itself
free from what it comes to regard as an alien power. It follows, then, that
the colonies had a right to revolt and establish an American nation even
without a showing of a "long train of Abuses."22 A benevolent despot is
still a despot.
What the Declaration seeks to join together-the consent of the
governed and the protection of individual liberties-is therefore not
required logically, and has often been severed in practice. This fact has
been demonstrated all too often in the history of political revolutions;
sometimes they protect people's rights, but sometimes they do not. And
much depends on which people's rights we are asking about-the losers in
a regime change often lose rights they enjoyed beforehand.
Thus, the right of self-determination need have little to do with strong
theories of individual rights, inalienable or not. Instead, the right of self-
determination has everything to do with assertions of collective identity
and the political rights that are assumed to attach to this identity. The right
of self-determination is a nationalist right: the right of a people to define
21. The most famous example is Alexander Bickel's constitutional theory. ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
Bickel simultaneously warns against the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," while praising the Supreme
Court for being "the pronouncer and guardian of [constitutional] values," id. at 16, 24, and protecting
fundamental rights through principled decisionmaking. Id. at 24-28. Robert McCloskey's classic, The
American Supreme Court, emphasizes the tension between democracy and individual rights, noting that
an important role of the Supreme Court is safeguarding constitutional rights against majority rule. See
generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (Daniel J. Boorstin ed., 1st ed.
1960).
22. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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itself, and then to govern itself. Unless there is only "one People"23
occupying a particular territory, it is likely that self-determination by a
particular group of people will come at the price of diminishing or even
ignoring rights held by a different people in the same territory.
C. WHO ARE THE PEOPLE?
These considerations lead naturally to the next set of problems. If the
right to alter or abolish is a collective right of "one People,"24 the question
then becomes: Who counts as the "People" who is entitled to exercise the
rights of the Declaration? How is the relevant political community to be
defined? 25 Does the community consist of everyone in a particular
territory? Or does the "People" consist of some subset, defined by race,
ethnicity, religion, language, or place? Should the relevant people be
limited to those who have signed a loyalty oath or otherwise demonstrated
commitment to the welfare of the community?
How much do sheer numbers count? How many individuals must
band together to constitute "one People" for purposes of the Declaration's
right to alter or abolish? And, as noted above, what happens if there are
disagreements about national identity, and dissenters who refuse to accept
the existence of "one People," much less a right to rule over them?
For many years, people in Quebec have argued for the right of the
Quebecois to secede unilaterally from the rest of Canada. 26 Do the
inhabitants of Quebec constitute "one People"? Not only are there many
Anglophone Canadians who have no desire to join in such a venture, but
there are also Original Peoples living in Quebec who might legitimately
claim their own "peoplehood.' '27 Note once again that he claim to secede is
actually the assertion of a right to take full political control of a territory
associated with the idea of "one People," even if that territory contains
many people who are not French speakers, or who do not want to secede.
23. Id. para. 1.
24. Id.
25. See Sanford Levinson, "Who Counts?" "'Sez Who?, " 58 U. ST. Louis L.J. 937 (2014).
26. See, e.g., DAVID HALJAN, CONSTITUTIONALISING SECESSION (2014); WAYNE NORMAN,
NEGOTIATING NATIONALISM: NATION-BUILDING, FEDERALISM, AND SECESSION IN THE
MULTINATIONAL STATE (2006).
27. See Inuit Regions of Canada, INUIT TAPIRIIT KANATAMI, http://www.itk.ca/about-inuit/inuit-
regions-canada (last visited Mar. 7, 2016).
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D. How "DESTRUCTIVE OF THESE ENDS" DOES THE CURRENT
GOVERNMENT HAVE TO BE FOR A PEOPLE TO WITHHOLD ITS CONSENT?
Although, as noted above, popular consent is logically distinct from
protection of rights, in the Declaration's formulation the right to alter or
abolish is triggered when the current government has been destructive of
the ends for which governments are instituted.
Who decides whether the existing government has been sufficiently
destructive of the ends for which governments are instituted? Is it enough if
government occurs without the consent of those who have a legally
recognized right to vote? But the problem may be that the people lack
effective representation, as occurred in the American colonies.
What if a group of people possesses formal rights of representation,
but its views are predictably "swamped" by permanent majorities, so that in
the view of the affected group, they are effectively without a voice in the
operating institutions of government? Examples are legion, both in the
United States and elsewhere.
Israeli Arabs have a right to vote and in fact elected more than a dozen
Arab members of the Knesset in the 2015 elections.28 But could they not
insist that their interests are effectively ignored by Israeli coalition
governments, and that they therefore have a right to independence?
Or take the case of Scotland with the United Kingdom. Perhaps
Scottish independence has seemed attractive because Scots believe that
their voice is effectively overwhelmed by the 84 percent English majority
in the United Kingdom.29 One reason why Southern states seceded in 1861
is that they believed that they would no longer be able to hold off Northern
28. Shlomi Eldar, Israeli Arabs Disappointed by Election Results, AL MONITOR (Sandy Bloom
trans., Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/israel-elections-2015-arab-
union-list-netanyahu-racism.html.
29. See 2011 Census: Population Estimates for the United Kingdom, March 2011, OFF. NAT'L
STAT. (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populati
onandmigration/populationestimates/bulletins/20 11 censuspopulationestimatesfortheunitedkingdom/201
2-12-17. As the result of the stunning victory of the Scottish National Party in the 2015 parliamentary
elections in the United Kingdom, the party that adamantly supported secession (and is presumably not
averse to that possibility in the future) occupies fifty-six of the fifty-nine Scottish seats in Parliament.
Jason Douglas, Scottish National Party Wins Landslide in U.K. Election 2015, WALL ST. J. (May 8,
2015, 12:15 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/scottish-national-party-heads-for-landslide-in-u-k-
election-2015-14310362 3 2 . The majority of Scots, who, according to the BBC, had voted "decisively"
against independence only eight months earlier may well feel inadequately represented by the nearly 95
percent secessionist majority of Scottish representatives in Parliament. Scottish Referendum: Scotland
Votes "No" to Independence, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-
29270441.
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majorities who sought to prevent the expansion of slavery.30
The language of the Declaration suggests, moreover, that the right to
alter or abolish is not only triggered when rights of representation are
denied. Rather, it is trigged when any inalienable right (including the right
to life) is violated, or when the relevant people conclude that they can no
longer "pursu[e] . . . Happiness" 31 sufficiently under existing political
conditions.
This is not only a question of the identity and content of rights, but
also of the degree of their violation. Must a "long train of Abuses"32 have
occurred over a sufficiently long time, or is it enough to claim that abuses
exist now, and, in the view of the relevant people, are sufficiently
intolerable?
How intolerable must things be to invoke the right to alter or
abolish? 33 Must the public have been reduced, in the words of the
Declaration, to an "absolute Despotism,"34 or might the relevant people
who seek to alter or abolish government get to decide that something less
might justify changing the form of government?35 After all, why should
30. See, e.g., Confederate Slates of America-Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which
Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-century/csascarsec.asp (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) ("On the 4th day of
March next, [the Republican] party will take possession of the Government. It has announced that the
South shall be excluded from the common territory, that the judicial tribunals shall be made sectional,
and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United states."); James
Oliver Horton, Confronting Slavery and Revealing the "Lost Cause," NAT'L PARK SERV.,
http://www.nps.gov/resources/story.htm?id=217 (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) (explaining the consensus
of professional historians that the desire to preserve slavery was the cause of Southern secession.)
31. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
32. Id.
33. Consider, for example, the case of abortion. Some anti-abortion advocates regard the forty
years of legalized abortion in the United States as a Holocaust. See, e.g., SURVIVORS ABORTION
HOLOCAUST, http://www.survivors.la/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2016). Why would this not be sufficient to
withdraw allegiance to the United States government? For a discussion of whether religious citizens can
continue to maintain allegiance to a government that allows abortion as a constitutional right, see
Robert H. Bork et al., The End of Democracy? The Judicial Usurpation of Politics, FIRST THINGS (Nov.
1996), http://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/1 1/001-the-end-of-democracy-the-judicial-usurpation-
of-politics.
34. See infra Part I.G.
35. For example, following the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015),
recognizing same-sex marriage, presidential candidate Mike Huckabee declared that "I will not
acquiesce to an imperial court any more than our Founders acquiesced to an imperial British monarch.
We must resist and reject judicial tyranny, not retreat." Huckabee Blasts SCOTUS, HUCKABEE 2016
(June 26, 2015), http://mikehuckabee.com/blogs?ID=3CAAABD5-9321-47FC-8D71-1156A6F56FB7.
Huckabee was probably not advocating armed rebellion, but if one felt strongly enough about the issue,
why wouldn't the destruction of traditional marriage be grounds for invoking the Declaration's right to
alter or abolish?
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people have to wait for something to develop as bad as, say, Nazi
Germany, before it may exercise its inalienable rights to alter or abolish?
Should the people not be able to move proactively?
By what metric would one measure these abuses? And what if there
are disagreements within the relevant population?36 We noted previously
that the American colonies were full of Loyalists who did not seek
separation from the British Crown. Should the question be decided by
majority vote? If so, what procedures should be employed? We will return
to these questions when we discuss the role, if any, that democracy and the
rule of law play in the right to alter or abolish.37
E. FROM THE RULE OF RECOGNITION TO THE ROLE OF RECOGNITION
The right to alter or abolish does not depend solely on the will of the
"one People"' 38 who exercises it. Rather, it also depends, in a practical
sense, on other countries recognizing the new entity as a legitimate state.
Other countries, however, may choose to recognize (or not recognize) a
new state for a variety of different reasons. These reasons may have little to
do with the Declaration's political theory, and everything to do with self-
interest, strategic advantage, and other aspects of realpolitik.
The factual background to the Declaration provides a ready example.
Declaring independence was one thing; winning it was another. And
winning independence depended on recognition by other nations,
particularly Britain's great geopolitical rival, France. France was a
monarchy, and had no use for Jefferson's theories about democracy, much
less the right to revolt. It was nevertheless engaged in a bitter struggle for
world domination with Britain, and the Revolutionary War was, in one
sense, a sideshow in a larger world war between Europe's two greatest
powers.39 Eventually, the French Crown understood that supporting the
Americans would help it undermine British power.
40
In fact, the Declaration of Independence was not worth the parchment
it was written on without recognition by other nations. Countries that
recognized the new United States of America not only gave credence to
America's claims in international law, they could also be sources of
36. For example, while some members of the public might regard legalized abortion as a twenty-
first century Holocaust, others might regard it as a constitutional guarantee of women's rights.
37. See infra Part I.G.
38. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
39. ARMITAGE, supra note 7, at 83-84.
40. French Alliance, French Assistance, and European Diplomacy During the American
Revolution, 1778-1782, U.S. DEP'T ST. OFF. HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-
1783/french-alliance (last visited Mar. 18, 2016).
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financial or military support. In particular, France's recognition of
American independence following the Patriot victory at Saratoga in 1777
(led, ironically, by Benedict Arnold) proved crucial, as did French military
and naval support at the Battle of Yorktown.41 The Treaty of Paris, an
agreement brokered by key European powers, was required for Great
Britain to formally surrender its claims to the territory of its former
colonies and accept the colonies' independence as a matter of international
law.
42
F. SUBMITTING THE FACTS TO A CANDID WORLD
The role of international recognition gives particular meaning to the
Declaration's challenge-"let Facts be submitted to a candid World."43 The
Declaration points to international public opinion as the appropriate judge
of whether there is a right to alter or abolish. This is not merely a matter of
seeking an impartial, objective observer. It may also be a matter of
practical necessity. Although the relevant people decides whether it has the
right to alter or abolish, often the decision means little if the international
community fails to support its case. The support may range from
international recognition to material assistance, financial guarantees, and
even military intervention. International support may be especially
important in cases of "humanitarian intervention," or in other situations in
which the relevant people calls on the international community to take
action to guarantee its inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.
The Declaration does not make the rights it announces contingent on
international support-after all, it decrees them "unalienable" and "self-
evident."44 Nevertheless, these rights may prove effectively unenforceable
unless some portion of the "candid World" comes to the rescue. Thus, the
right to alter or abolish often boils down to not only the ability to claim and
hold on to real estate, but also the prospects for international support and
intervention. Rightly or wrongly, the right to alter or abolish often rests in
the hands of relative strangers, who must be persuaded, for whatever
reason, that the "People's" struggle is their struggle as well.
41. ARMITAGE, supra note 7, at 81-83.
42. Id. at 84 ("The United States formally entered the international system upon joining the
Franco-American alliance; only after that could the question of American independence be treated as a
positive, albeit contested, international fact." (emphasis added)). But, obviously, Great Britain contested
this "fact" for another five years, and one can be confident that a different result at the Battle of
Yorktown would have wiped out any significance of French recognition of the Declaration and returned
a chastened group of colonies to British rule. See id. at 85, 87.
43. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2.
44. Id.
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A recent example of how international recognition affects national
self-determination involves Kosovo's unilateral declaration of
independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008.45 The International Court
of Justice issued an advisory opinion46 that upheld the right of the Kosovars
to issue their declaration under international law, while refusing to decide
whether the declaration had any legal consequences under international
law,47 including the obvious question of "whether or not Kosovo ha[d]
achieved statehood.'48 The court preferred to the leave this question to the
decisions of individual nations. As of June 2015, 108 of the 193 member
nations of the United Nations have recognized Kosovo as an independent
country.49 Indeed, the United States recognized Kosovo the day after the
Kosovars' unilateral declaration, on February 18, 2008.50 However, one
Western European country, Spain, has not done so. 51 It takes little
imagination to see why: Spain faces its own secessionist movement in
Catalonia,52 and the Spanish government wants to avoid any suggestion
that secessionist movements should be approved, much less encouraged, by
the international community.
45. Kosovo Declaration of Independence, REPUBLIC Kos. ASSEMBLY (Feb. 17, 2008),
http://www.assembly-kosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635.
46. Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403 122 (July 22), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/141/1 5987.pdf.
47. Id. 56 ("The Court is not required by the question it has been asked to take a position on
whether international law conferred a positive entitlement on Kosovo unilaterally to declare its
independence or, a fortiori, on whether international law generally confers an entitlement on entities
situated within a State unilaterally to break away from it. Indeed, it is entirely possible for a particular
act--such as a unilateral declaration of independence-not o be in violation of international law
without necessarily constituting the exercise of a right conferred by it. The Court has been asked for an
opinion on the first point, not the second.").
48. Id. 51.
49. IMF, Republic of Kosovo, Country Report No. 15/131, at 4 (2015),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/scr/2015/crl 5131 .pdf; International Recognitions of the Republic
of Kosovo, REPUBLIC KOS. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,224 (last visited
Mar. 6, 2016).
50. Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Recognizes Kosovo as Independent State, U.S. DEP'T ST. ARCHIVE
(Feb. 18, 2008), http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/02/100973.htm.
51. Jeff Israely, Why Kosovo Divides Europe, TIME (Feb. 19, 2008),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1714413,00.html.
52. Ashifa Kassam, Catalan Secession Bid Ruled Unconstitutional by Spanish Court, GUARDIAN
(Dec. 2, 2015, 1:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/02/catalonia-secession-
unconstitutional-spanish-court.
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G. How Do DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW MATTER? MUST THE
PEOPLE EXHAUST REASONABLE REMEDIES? Is THERE A DUTY TO
NEGOTIATE WITH THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT BEFORE ALTERING OR
ABOLISHING?
The American colonists ultimately decided to revolt. But the
Declaration explains that this decision did not occur to them suddenly. "In
every stage of these Oppressions," the Declaration explains, "we have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions
have been answered only by repeated Injury." 53 Moreover:
We have warned [our British brethren] from Time to Time of Attempts
by their Legislature to extend an unwarrantable Jurisdiction over us. We
have reminded them of the Circumstances of our Emigration and
Settlement here. We have appealed to their native Justice and
Magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the Ties of our common
Kindred to disavow these Usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt
our Connections and Correspondence.
54
Is this simply a matter of political prudence, or is it required by the
nature of the right to alter or abolish? Does the right require some degree of
warning or good faith negotiation with an existing government, and is the
existing government, in turn, required to negotiate in good faith with
would-be rebels or secessionists?
In answering these questions, does it matter how democratic the
existing government is? If the government is substantially democratic, does
this mean that only non-violent, democratic methods are allowed? In such
circumstances, does the right to alter or abolish require following existing
procedures and legal norms for separation, or does it allow at least some
methods that are currently extralegal? After all, if a political minority is
shut out of government, following the existing rules will probably not
provide an adequate remedy.
Once again, Quebec provides a useful example. The Supreme Court of
Canada actually laid down requirements that the Canadian government
should negotiate in good faith if a "clear majority"-presumably something
more than a bare 50 percent-voted for independence in a referendum in
which the issue was "clearly" presented.55 Its decision purported to impose
duties not only on the federal government in Ottawa, but also on the
53. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 30 (U.S. 1776).
54. Id. para. 31.
55. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 220 (Can.).
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Quebecois separatists themselves.56
In fact, in 2000 the Canadian Parliament passed a Clarity Act that
ostensibly provided a legal framework for secession; yet, despite its name,
the rules it provides are anything but clear.57 In any case, what difference
should either the Clarity Act or the Supreme Court's decision make to
Quebec's right to leave Canada? Suppose that the separatists ignored both
the Act and the Supreme Court's ruling-for example, by simply
proclaiming that a bare majority of 50 percent plus one was sufficient. Is
the right of the people of Quebec to alter or abolish contingent on following
the rules laid down by organs of the state whose authority they reject? Or is
this merely, as before, a question of political prudence?
H. BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY?
The issue of prudence leads naturally to a final question. Let us
assume that the relevant people is easily defined, that it is sufficiently clear
that the existing regime has been "destructive" of the ends for which
governments are instituted, and that enough of the relevant population in
the relevant territory agrees. Is the relevant people permitted to use any
means necessary "to alter or to abolish,"58 or must it choose the least
violent alternative if practically possible? Does the right to alter or abolish,
56. See id. at 267. To be sure, the court did not declare that Quebec had a "right" to secede, but
only that the Canadian government would be under a duty to engage in good faith negotiations that
might well lead to the necessary constitutional amendment that would recognize the dissolution of the
existing Canadian federation. Id. at 267-68.
57. See Clarity Act, R.S.C. 2000, c 26 s 1(1) (Can.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-
31.8.pdf. The Act requires the House of Commons to consider any question that a provincial
government "intends to submit to its voters in a referendum relating to the proposed secession of the
province from Canada," and to "set out its determination on whether the question is clear" with regard
to manifesting a popular will to secede from Canada. Id.
The Canadian government is forbidden to enter into negotiations about secession in the absence
of a referendum that provides "clear expression" by the people of the province "on whether the province
should cease to be part of Canada." Id. s 1(3). Furthermore, there must be a "clear expression of a will
by a clear majority of the population of that province that the province cease to be part of Canada." Id.
s 2(1) (emphasis added). In determining the existence of such a majority, the House of Commons must
consider: "(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist option; (b) the
percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and (c) any other matters or circumstances it
considers to be relevant." Id. s 2(2). Among these "other matters or circumstances" to be taken into
account is the view of the "Aboriginal peoples." Id. s 2(3).
Finally, inasmuch as any secession would require a constitutional amendment, "[n]o Minister of
the Crown shall propose a constitutional amendment to effect the secession of a province from Canada
unless the Government of Canada has addressed, in its negotiations, the terms of secession that are
relevant in the circumstances, including the division of assets and liabilities, any changes to the borders
of the province, the rights, interests and territorial claims of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, and the
protection of minority rights." Id. s 3(2).
58. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2.
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in other words, require an exhaustion of peaceful alternatives, or is this also
merely a question of political prudence?
Is terrorism justified if it is designed to push the cause of
independence forward? One might consider examples ranging from the
Boston Tea Party (and the tarring and feathering of British officials) to
political violence by Zionist groups in British Mandate Palestine, to any
number of "freedom fighters" in nationalist movements around the world.
What, if anything, does the Declaration of Independence have to say about
the tactics of these groups? Does it tell us when violence is permissible to
enforce the right to alter or abolish, or what the limits to this violence might
be?
II. THREE WAYS TO ALTER OR ABOLISH
So far we have considered questions of when the right to alter or
abolish may legitimately be exercised. A different set of questions concerns
how the right might be successfully invoked. The language of the
Declaration suggests three paradigm cases of a right to alter or abolish,
which, in practice, may fade into each other. We might interpret the
Declaration as offering (a) a right to extralegal or extraconstitutional
reform; (b) a right to political revolution or political overthrow; or (c) a
right to self-determination and/or secession.
Let us consider each of these cases in turn.
A. THE RIGHT TO EXTRALEGAL / EXTRACONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Suppose that a group of citizens mobilizes against what they regard as
the corruption of the democratic process by inequalities of wealth and by
secret campaign expenditures by the super-rich. Despairing of surmounting
the strict requirements of Article V, 59 they decide to hold a national
referendum for a new constitution, which they insist will go into operation
upon ratification by 50.1 percent of the voting public. Defenders of the
proposal argue that they are exercising their right to alter or abolish a
national government that no longer enjoys the consent of the governed, but
only the consent of the very wealthiest people. According to the
Declaration, do they have the political right to engage in an
extraconstitutional course of conduct and offer an alternative to the current
constitution?
The Philadelphia Convention offers a strong precedent for their action.
59. See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring a two-thirds majority of both the House and Senate to call a
convention to propose amendments o the Constitution).
2016]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:399
A group of interested citizens persuaded some (but not all) state legislatures
to send delegates to Philadelphia for a convention that quickly exceeded its
mandate to suggest revisions to the Articles of Confederation. 60 The
resulting document-the Constitution-then bypassed state legislatures,
and was placed before state ratifying conventions.61 Despite the Articles'
guarantee of perpetual union, and despite the requirement of unanimity for
amendments to the Articles, the Constitution was considered in force as
soon as nine of the thirteen states ratified it.
62
In Federalist No. 40, James Madison defended the unconventional
(and perhaps even illegal) procedures that underlay the Philadelphia
Convention; he also defended the substitution of the Constitution's Article
VII for the clear and unequivocal language of Article XIII of the existing
"constitution," the Articles of Confederation.63 Perhaps not surprisingly,
this is the one place in The Federalist hat alludes to the Declaration of
Independence. 64 Moreover, as Christian Fritz has emphasized in his
invaluable book on state constitutional formations in the early nineteenth
century,65 the people of the states often freely discarded their existing state
constitutions under the authority of the natural right of a free people to
"alter and to abolish" their systems whenever they were unhappy with their
existing ones.
60. See Constitutional Convention and Ratification, 1787-1789, U.S. DEP'T ST. OFF. HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/ 1784-1800/convention-and-ratification (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
61. See I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 320-32 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
62. Compare ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII (stating that amendments require
unanimous consent of the states), with U.S. CONST. art. VII (noting that ratification of nine states is
sufficient to establish a new constitution).
63. In a September 30, 1787 letter to George Washington, Madison wrote that Richard Henry
Lee had tried to derail the Constitution in the Confederation Congress. See Letter from James Madison
to George Washington (Sept. 30, 1787), in 5 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, IN THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787; WITH A DIARY OF THE DEBATES
OF CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION 566, 566-67 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1845). First, Lee objected that
the proposed Constitution went beyond the Confederation. Id. at 566. Second, Lee argued that the
Confederation Congress hould take up amendments to the document before submitting it to the states.
Id. This suggestion was rebutted because "the Act of the Convention, when altered would instantly
become the mere act of Congress, and must be proposed by them as such, and of course be addressed to
the Legislatures, not conventions of the States, and require the ratification of thirteen instead of nine
States." Id. at 566-67.
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison) ("[A] rigid adherence to [form over substance]
would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the people to 'abolish or alter
their governments as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness'...." (citing
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE)).
65. CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 28 (2009).
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The most dramatic example is the 1841-42 Dorr Rebellion in Rhode
Island, which briefly led to two rival state governments; it is best
remembered today for giving rise to the 1849 decision in Luther v.
Borden.66 The Doff Rebellion suggests how far-reaching the Declaration's
theory of extraconstitutional change might be in practice. Indeed, the
radical implications of the Declaration's theory proved too much for even
the revolutionary generation. When Vermont attempted to join the Union in
1777 after having seceded from parts of New York and New Hampshire, it
was met with a stony refusal even by people who were, at that very
moment, seeking to secede from the British Empire.
67
"Spontaneous"-or at least legally unconventional-referenda re not
the only type of extraconstitutional reform that might fall within the
Declaration's right to alter or abolish. A mobilized public might discard
particular aspects of the current constitution and agree to substitute new
ones. This is akin to Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments.
68
One can also imagine a situation of great emergency-civil or world war,
for example-in which the public demands that the current President stay
in office despite the two-term limit in the Twenty-Second Amendment.69
At some point, the act of discarding constitutional norms will start to look
less like a new constitution and more like a coup. To the extent that the
change in government is regarded as a coup, this category begins to merge
with the next one: political revolution.
B. POLITICAL REVOLUTION / OVERTHROW OF THE GOVERNMENT
Next, imagine that a sizeable group of United States citizens believes
that President Obama has become a tyrant.70 Like their patriot forbears,
66. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 18 (1849) ("[A] majority of the free white male citizens of
Rhode Island.... in the exercise of the sovereignty of the people, .... and in the absence, under the then
existing frame of government of... Rhode Island, of any provision therein for amending, altering,
reforming, changing, or abolishing the said frame of government, had the right to reassume the powers
of government .... ).
67. See BARRY ALAN SHAIN, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT:
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PETITIONS, PROCLAMATIONS & LETTERS OF THE DELEGATES TO THE FIRST
NATIONAL CONGRESSES 9, 532 (2014).
68. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 108 (1991).
69. See generally CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) (illustrating the notion that presidential term limits are
potentially dysfunctional or even "stupid"); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Crises,
157 U. PA. L. REv. 707 (2009) (connecting constitutional crises to deliberate decisions to violate
constitutional norms).
70. See, e.g., Matthew Jacobs, David Mamet: Obama is a "Tyrant, " HUFFINGTON POST (Nov.
29, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/29/david-mamet-obama-n_
4360243.html; Bruce Thornton, Obama the Tyrant: A Presidential Overreach that Undermines the
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they recite "a long Train of Abuses,71 including his attempts to limit their
Second Amendment rights, his imperial assertion of the right to allow
undocumented immigrants to remain in the country and apply for work
permits, his expansion of the national surveillance state, the redistribution
of tax revenues to support groups they disdain, and Obamacare's
imposition of the individual mandate-yet another tax-to purchase health
insurance. According to the Declaration, do these aggrieved citizens have a
''self-evident" right to overthrow the United States government and "to
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such Principles, and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness"?
72
One might immediately object: all that the Declaration means is that
citizens have the right to use normal, non-violent methods of democracy to
change the government and elect someone else to protect their rights. But
the facts of the Declaration belie that placid assumption. After all, the
colonies were not simply asserting the right to representation in Parliament.
The Declaration does not say that if Great Britain had suddenly changed
course, and allowed the colonies representation in Parliament, that the right
"to alter or to abolish" would thereby be extinguished.73 The right would
still remain, as long as, in the eyes of the governed public, the resulting
government was still destructive of the ends of guaranteeing inalienable
rights. And one of those rights articulated by proponents of the Revolution
was the freedom from parliamentary rule save in very restricted
circumstances. 74 To be granted the right to send a representative to a
Parliament that rejected the American critique of Parliament's powers
would be like receiving a deck chair on the Titanic.
To be sure, the Declaration immediately goes on to say that people are
unlikely to exercise their rights to alter or abolish except in the most
extreme cases: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long
established should not be changed for light and transient Causes; and
accordingly all experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to
suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the
Forms to which they are accustomed." 75 But as the language of the
Most Important Foundation of the Western Political Tradition, FRONTPAGE MAG (Nov. 23, 2014),
http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/bruce-thomton/obama-the-tyrant/.
71. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See generally ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING (2014); SHAIN, supra note 67, at 24.
75. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2.
[Vol. 89:399
TO ALTER OR ABOLISH
Declaration itself indicates, the notion that the right to alter or abolish
should not be lightly invoked is a consideration of prudence, not a question
of political right. Thus, the Declaration confidently asserts, if a people
decide that there has been "a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations," it is
not only the people's "Right" to act, "it is their Duty, to throw off such
Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security.,
76
C. SELF-DETERMINATION / SECESSION
Finally, suppose that several counties in the state of Montana decide
that they want no more of the United States of America and decide to
secede. Or imagine that a group of conservative Christians decide to move
to those counties to create a Christian homeland free from the strictures of
secular government. According to the Declaration, do the citizens in this
part of the state have the "self-evident" right to leave the Union and
"institute new Government"?77 This, of course, was the assertion of the
states of the Confederacy when they left the Union.
One might insist that, despite its language, the Declaration does not
actually recognize such a right. All that it guarantees is the right of the
United States as a whole to decide whether to split up, and it must do so
through a fair, open, and democratic process. If Congress agrees to allow
part of Montana to go its own way, the rights guaranteed in the Declaration
have been served.
Yet once again the actual context of the Declaration undermines the
idea that the right to alter or abolish can be limited in this way. After all,
the colonies did not think that they needed the permission of Great Britain
to leave, or that secession would be legitimate only if it emerged from a
fair, open, and democratic process within the British Empire. Moreover, as
noted earlier, the precedent of the Philadelphia Convention points in the
opposite direction. Following the Convention, nine states decided to secede
from the "perpetual union" established by the Articles of Confederation
78
to create the new government of the United States of America. Even if the
other four states had not eventually joined them, they had asserted their
right to begin a new political regime without obtaining the permission of
the states left behind. Louisiana Senator Judah Benjamin made precisely
this point to his colleagues in his farewell speech in December 1860,79
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII, para. 2.
79. Judah Philip Benjamin, You Can Never Subjugate Us, in 5 GREAT DEBATES IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 365, 384-87 (1913) (speech made to the Senate, Dec. 31, 1860). See also Dave Benner, Judah
P. Benjamin: Able Statesman, Forgotten Patriot, ABBEVILLE INST.: ABBEVILLE BLOG (Sept. 4, 2015),
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before leaving Washington to join the Confederate States of America,
which had decided to break with the Union and form a new constitution in
February 1861.80
D. UNUM OR E PLURIBUS?
Secession, of course, can involve not only breaking away from a
larger entity, but also a decision to join another polity after leaving the first.
New England, for example, might secede from the United States to join
Canada, much as Texas left Mexico only to join the United States several
years later. Nor does secession require that a single entity be formed. The
end of British rule in India quickly led to the creation of the separate
countries of India and Pakistan, and, sometime later, the secession of
Bangladesh from Pakistan.
81
Moreover, the language of the Declaration does not, pace Lincoln,
unequivocally require recognition of a single indissoluble country. The
penultimate sentence of the Declaration describes the creation of multiple
entities, not a single nation.82 It states:
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and
Independent States; that they are absolved from all Allegiance to the
British Crown, and that all political Connection between them and the
State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as
Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts
and Things which Independent States may of right do.
83
Although John Jay would insist in Federalist No. 2, echoing the
beginning of the Declaration, that Americans were a single people joined
by language, custom, and religion,84 the truth was quite different. As
Danielle Allen notes in her magisterial explication of the Declaration, the
claim that the former colonies constituted a single people was "surprising.
They had long been a very fractious set of quite diverse communities-
from all the various parts of England, as well as from Ireland, Scotland,
http://www.abbevilleinstitute.org/blog/judah-p-benjamin-able-statesman-forgotten-patriot/ (referring to
his "farewell speech").
80. Benjamin, supra note 79, at 384-87.
81. August 15, 1947: India and Pakistan Win Independence, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/
this-day-in-history/india-and-pakistan-win-independence (last visited Mar. 9, 2016); After Partition:
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in-depth/629/629/6922293.stm
(last updated Aug. 8, 2007).
82. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 33.
83. Id.
84. THE FEDERALIST No. 2 (John Jay).
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Wales, the Netherlands, and Germany."8 5 "Puritans with rigorous demands
for personal and public morality" contrasted with members of more
latitudinarian sects.86 (After all, the Puritans had hung Quakers and exiled
Roger Williams to Rhode Island.87) Nor were the colonies homogenous in
language. In 1787, the Constitution was translated into German for the
benefit of the German-speaking community in Pennsylvania, who might
have otherwise had difficulty understanding the country's new charter.
88
Moreover, one must assume that, like many other American "Patriots" of
1776, Jay would have been delighted had French-speaking Quebec joined
the insurrection against Great Britain.89 In any event, as Armitage notes,
following the Revolution, "European commentators ... construed" the
1781 Articles of Confederation not as the political constitution of a single
people, but "as an international agreement entered into by thirteen free and
independent states."
90
85. ALLEN, supra note 15, at 116.
86. Id.
87. FRANCIS J. BREMER, THE PURITAN EXPERIMENT: NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY FROM BRADFORD
TO EDWARDS xvi, xxi (1995).
88. Christina Mulligan et al., Founding-Era Translations of the Constitution 3 (Brooklyn Law
Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 402, 2014), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2486301.
89. Note that for Allen, "one People" means "simply a group with shared political
institutions... separate and different from those of the mother country." ALLEN, supra note 15, at 116.
But are "shared political institutions" sufficient to constitute a nation, if the inhabitants differ in
language, ethnicity, custom and religion? The late political scientist Samuel P. Huntington did not think
so. He described this assumption as the "classic Enlightenment-based, civic concept of a nation," in
which nationalism, lacking any other commonalities, was predicated entirely on commitment to abstract
propositions and the institutions predicated on them. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE
CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 19 (2004). "History and psychology, however,
suggest that this is unlikely to be enough to sustain a nation for long." Id. Allen might respond that,
despite the diversity of its population among multiple dimensions, America has held together for some
240 years; while Huntington might point to the Civil War and the uneasy reconciliation of the North
and South in the postbellum period.
90. ARMITAGE, supra note 7, at 88. Ironically, this conceptualization of the Articles gives succor
to some, like Akhil Reed Amar, who reject the narrative of illegal conduct by the Philadelphia
Convention and instead defend its radicalism on the ground that the patent inefficacy of the
Confederation-described by Edmund Randolph and Alexander Hamilton alike as an "imbecility"--
meant that it had lost its status as a binding international agreement of "perpetual union." See Akhil
Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 457, 466-67 (1994); DAVID ROBERTSON, THE ORIGINAL COMPROMISE-WHAT THE
CONSTITUTION'S FRAMERS WERE REALLY THINKING 61 (2012) ("The imbecility of the Confederation
is equally conspicuous when called upon to support a war." (quoting Edmund Randolph)); THE
FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The imbecility of our government even forbids [foreign
powers] to treat with us.").
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
III. WOODROW WILSON AND THE DYNAMITE OF SELF-
DETERMINATION
Among the many advocates of the right of peoples to self-
determination, surely one of the most important in the past century is
Woodrow Wilson. There is a direct link between the Declaration of
Independence's right to alter or abolish and Wilson's embrace, in a famous
1918 address to Congress, of the political right to "self-determination."
91
This connection becomes even more obvious if we recall that Wilson,
despite having served as the president of Princeton University and the
governor of New Jersey, was the first native Southerner to win the White
House since the 1840s. Wilson was born in Virginia in 1856, but his family
soon moved to Augusta, Georgia, where his father accepted a call to head
the local Presbyterian Church and, more importantly, to "become an ardent
spokesman for the Southern cause."92 Wilson was just shy of four when the
Civil War broke out, and it proved a formative influence on his thinking. In
his book, Division and Reunion, written only two years before he became
president, Wilson offered a distinctively Southern perspective on the war as
the South's "Lost Cause": "The triumph of Mr. Lincoln," he wrote, "was,
in her [the South's] eyes, nothing less than the establishment in power of a
party bent upon the destruction of the southern system and the defeat of
southern interests, even to the point of countenancing and assisting" slave
revolts.93 "It seemed evident to the southern men," Wilson wrote, "that the
North would not pause or hesitate because of constitutional guarantees.94
Moreover,
Southern pride, ... was stung to the quick by the position in which the
South found itself.... They knew that they did not deserve such
reprobation [as they were receiving from Northern opponents of slavery].
They knew that their lives were honorable, their relations with their
slaves humane, their responsibility for the existence of slavery among
them remote.
95
Indeed, Wilson argued, as a result of the 1860 election, "power had
been given to a geographical, a sectional, party, ruthlessly hostile to
91. Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress on International Order: February 11, 1918, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1 10448 (last visited Mar. 7,
2016).
92. A. ScoTr BERG, WILSON 30,34 (2013).
93. WOODROW WILSON, EPOCHS OF AMERICAN HISTORY: DIVISION AND REUNION 1829-1909,
at 208 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1916) [hereinafter WILSON, DIVISION AND REUNION] (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 208-09.
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[Southern] interests."
96
One could hardly find a more sympathetic account of why Southerners
in 1860 had reason to believe that they enjoyed a right of self-
determination recognized in the Declaration of Independence. In fact,
Wilson argued that the South might have had the Constitution on its side:
"The principles upon which secession was attempted were.., plain enough
to everybody in the South, and needed no argument. The national idea had
never supplanted in the South the original theory of the Constitution.. . as
an instrument of confederation, not of national consolidation."
97
Some of these themes reappear in new guises in Wilson's famous
1918 speech defending the right of self-determination: "Peoples are not to
be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international
conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists," Wilson
proclaimed.98 Instead, "[n]ational aspirations must be respected; peoples
may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent."99 No
longer should "[s]elf-determination" be treated as "a mere phrase." 100
Rather, "[i]t is an imperative principle of actions which statesmen will
henceforth ignore at their peril."''
Wilson declared that the "roots" of the Great War lay "in the disregard
of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union
and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances
and their own forms of political life."' 102 Wilson believed that recognizing
claims of self-determination might give some small measure of meaning to
the slaughter that occurred between 1914 and 1918, and possibly prevent
future wars. Thus, Wilson famously asserted that "[e]very territorial
settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the
benefit of the populations concerned," in contrast to the claims of
traditional "rival states." 103 This meant that "all well-defined national
aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded
them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and
96. Id. at 212.
97. Id. at 241-42.
98. Wilson, supra note 91.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis added).
102. Id. Cf WILSON, DIVISION AND REUNION, supra note 93, at 212. In Division and Reunion,
Wilson described the South as having been pushed around by the rest of a rapidly developing country
while it alone had "stood still.., and retained the old [constitutional] principles which had once been
universal." Id. Wilson lamented that "[h]er slender economic resources were no match for the mighty
strength of the nation with which she had fallen out of sympathy." Id.
103. Wilson, supra note 91.
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antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and
consequently of the world."10 4 This language, of course does not specify
how these ends are to be achieved, and the qualifications at the end of the
sentence may place severe limitations on the right asserted at its beginning.
Self-determination disrupts settled expectations about the way the
world works, and in the process, it may unleash unpredictable forces. In
August 1991, as the Soviet Empire fell apart, Karl Meyer described
Woodrow Wilson as "the man of the hour in post-Communist Europe."
105
"From the Baltics to the Adriatic, from the Ukraine to the Balkans," Meyer
noted, "oppressed millions have given new life to his imperative-and
often troublesome-principle." 106 "Indeed, if results are the measure,
Wilson has proved a more successful revolutionary than Lenin."'0 7 Leninist
theory has mostly been in decline since 1991-although it is still given lip
service in the increasingly capitalist People's Republic of China. But the
language of popular sovereignty and self-determination can be found
everywhere. Preambles to contemporary national constitutions often speak
in the name of the people and their right to form a government.
10 8
Wilson's exuberant language did not go unchallenged even within his
own administration. His Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, described the
magic slogan of "self-determination" as "simply loaded with dynamite.''
1 9
In a confidential memorandum written in December 1918, Lansing asked,
altogether presciently:
What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the
nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and
rebellion? Will not the Mohammadans of Syria and Palestine and
possibly of Morocco and Tripoli rely on it? How can it be harmonized
with Zionism, to which the President is practically committed?110
104. Id. (emphasis added).




108. See, e.g., SPANISH CONSTITUTION, Dec. 27, 1978, pmbl. ("The Spanish Nation, desiring to
establish justice, liberty, and security, and to promote the wellbeing of all its members, in the exercise
of its sovereignty, proclaims its will .... ); CONSTITUTION OF UKRAINE, December 8, 2004, pmbl.
("The Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) of Ukraine on behalf of the Ukrainian people-Ukrainian
citizens of all nationalities, expressing the sovereign will of the people,. . . guided by the Act of
Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine of 24 August 1991, approved by the national vote of I
December 199 1, adopts this Constitution as the the Fundamental Law of Ukraine."); CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, Dec. 18, 1996, pmbl. ("We, the people of South Africa,... through
our freely elected representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic ... .
109. Meyer, supra note 105.
110. Id.
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Indeed, Lansing asked, would Wilson's own principle mean that
"Lincoln was wrong to deny self-determination to seceding Confederate
states?""' (Perhaps he was unfamiliar with Wilson's book on the Civil
War.) Moreover, what unit or category defined the self-determination of a
people? Was a people defined by race or ethnicity, by an already occupied
geographical territory, or simply by an inchoate sense of national
community? "Without a definite unit which is practical," Lansing wrote,
"application of this principle is dangerous to peace and stability.""' 2
The indeterminacy of Wilson's concept has been an invitation for
political opportunism. The idea of self-determination has been "trumpeted
by dictators as well as democrats," Meyer pointed out. 
113
Lenin's Bolsheviks championed self-determination-for those not under
Soviet control. Hitler claimed the right for those Herrenvolk who were
outside Germany, while subjugating whole nations without pity or
scruple.... [Moreover, t]o dissolve a union by unilateral secession can
nullify democracy and sunder a nation that owes its existence to an act of
self-determination. Few states are tidily homogeneous; frontiers are often
disputed. 114
Yet no matter how problematic Wilson's assertion of the principle of
self-determination, and no matter how many criticisms have been leveled at
it, it still survives in popular imagination,115 not to mention as a principle of
international law." 6 As Meyer recognizes, "qualifying a principle is very
different from rejecting it."117 A skeptical Lansing declared that Wilson's
vision was simply "the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger
until too late.... What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered!""
' i 8
Meyer responds: "[t]ry telling that to a billion people whose liberation has
been speeded by a doctrine enshrined in the first article of the United
Nations Charter,"119 which states that one of the "[p]urposes of the United
Nations" is "[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to
take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."
' 120
111. Id.
112. Id. See also supra Part I.C.
113. Meyer, supra note 105.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution:
Tensions in the Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644 (2014).
116. See sources cited supra note 108; infra note 120.
117. Meyer, supra note 105.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
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CONCLUSION
The Declaration's guarantees of inalienable rights of liberty and
equality, phrased in high-minded and abstract terminology, have generated
a host of issues: who should be treated equally with whom (and in what
respects), the rights that the people enjoy, the limits to these rights; and so
on. Moreover, there is an ongoing controversy about the provision of third-
generation economic rights, such as medical care or education, in addition
to first-generation negative rights to be free from state interference and
second-generation rights of political participation.
But the Declaration of Independence was more than an invitation to
discuss rights. It was, quite literally, a declaration of independence-an
assertion of the right to alter and abolish government and institute new
government. This right was its very reason for being. And the Declaration's
language on this central issue is every bit as puzzling as its language about
equality or inalienable rights. If the Declaration offers us little help in
defining the parameters of liberty and equality, it offers even less help in
explaining the contours of the right to change or overthrow governments.
This does not mean that the Declaration is without value today. Far
from it: it continues to serve as a source of inspiration for political reform,
not only in the United States, but around the world. But its value is
precisely that-as a source of inspiration-and not as a set of clear
guidelines or justifications for action. Today, even as it did in 1776, the
Declaration submits itself to a "candid World," posing questions that others
will have to answer-and answer for-in the crucible of practical politics.
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